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Abstract:  We explore several unaddressed issues in George Selgin’s (1988) claim that the best 
monetary system to maintain monetary equilibrium is a fractional reserve free banking one. The 
claim that adverse clearing balances would limit credit expansion in a fractional reserve free 
banking system is more troublesome than previously reckoned. Both lengthened clearing periods 
and interbank agreements render credit expansion unrestrained. “The theory of free banking” 
confuses increases in money held with increases in real savings, resulting in exacerbated economic 
cycles when fiduciary media is issued equally under both scenarios. Most troubling, these economic 
cycles generated by the free banking system breed an incentive to create a coordinating agent 
serving as a lender of last resort. The central bank is demonstrated to be a natural, if not 
unavoidable outgrowth of the fractional reserve free banking system.  
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Fractional Reserve Free Banking: Some Quibbles1 
 
Introduction 
What is the ideal monetary system? This is one of the most important questions of our age. To 
address this question, George Selgin (1988) makes an elaborate case for a fractional reserve free 
banking system.2 Selgin´s argument is especially noteworthy because he approaches this question 
from an economic point of view.3 He argues that 100 percent reserve banking (as well as central 
banking) has economically detrimental effects because it cannot maintain monetary equilibrium, 
thus leading to costly and unavoidable recessions.4 Selgin's synthesis of traditional Austrian and 
monetary disequilibrium theories to justify a free banking system brought new aspects to the debate 
concerning the ideal monetary system.  
While other authors have provided critiques of fractional reserve free banking (hereafter free 
banking) regarding economic consequences (Hoppe 1994, Huerta de Soto 2006, Hülsmann 1996), 
the thesis of Selgin et al has not been adequately scrutinized. It is one thing to point out the 
detrimental consequences of fractional reserve banking yet quite another to show that a fractional 
reserve free banking system is not required to maintain monetary equilibrium and that the 
supposedly equilibrating mechanisms of a fractional reserve banking system are, in fact, 
destabilizing. The economic necessity for and consequences of a fractional reserve free banking 
                                               
1
  We would like to thank, without indicting, Toby Baxendale, José Ignacio del Castillo Martínez, Anthony Evans, 
Jesús Huerta de Soto and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.  
2
 Other free banking defenses are found in Kevin Dowd (1989), David Glasner (1989), Lawrence White (1984; 1989), 
and Leland Yeager (1997). Selgin (1988) is significant as it spurred on many free banking theorists associated with 
the Austrian school of economics to adopt its arguments. See, for instance, White´s (1988) laudatory foreword to 
Selgin (1988), Steven Horwitz (1989; 1996; 2000; 2006), Larry Sechrest (2008), or Selgin and White (1994; 1996). 
Selgin (1994, 2001) later reinforced his own arguments. Selgin´s book marked a pivotal turning point in the spread 
of free banking ideas among Austrian economists. 
3
 Michael Rozeff (2010), Selgin (1988), Selgin and White (1996), and White (1989; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c) have also 
made ethical and legal arguments in favor of fractional reserve banking. The opposing viewpoint which regards 
fractional reserve banking as legally and ethically problematic is made most strongly in Philipp Bagus and David 
Howden (2009), William Barnett and Walter Block  (2005), Hans Hermann Hoppe (1994), Hoppe, Jörg Guido 
Hülsmann and Block (1998), Jesús Huerta de Soto (2006), Hülsmann (1996, 2008), and Murray Rothbard (1962). 
From the latter point of view, fractional reserve free banking is partly a misnomer, because in a “free” society such 
behavior would be forbidden. Fractional reserve free banking may have many advocates among libertarians because 
its name suggests freedom, even though its practice stands in direct contrast to the legal principles of a free society. 
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system represents a gap in the literature that requires further review and analysis.  
This study examines the remaining economic problems of a fractional reserve free banking 
system while abstaining from a discussion of legal and ethical issues. We focus our critique on 
Selgin (1988) due to its clarity and completeness. We demonstrate that fractional reserve free 
banking not only fails to restore the monetary equilibrium it alleges to create, but also generates 
effects that most free banking advocates consider detrimental.  
 
Monetary equilibrium and free banking 
Microeconomic coordination failures caused by monetary disequilibria were first systematically 
outlined by Herbert Davenport (1913), Clark Warburton (1946, 1966), Robert Greenfield (1994) 
and the series of articles contained in Yeager (1997). Selgin (1988) first elaborated the 
combination of these disequilibria with the doctrine of fractional reserve free banking. Selgin´s 
exposition proved so compelling that within several years, Horwitz (1996: 288) opined that: 
“The Austrian theory [of the trade cycle] and the monetary disequilibrium approach can be seen 
as explaining the consequences that follow from the two possible cases (inflation and deflation) 
in which monetary equilibrium is not maintained.” The Austrian theory of the business cycle 
(ABCT) developed in Vienna was seen as a more or less compatible doctrine with the American 
monetary disequilibrium approach. 
Monetary equilibrium is defined as “the state of affairs that prevails when there is neither 
an excess demand for money nor an excess supply of it at the existing level of prices” (Selgin 
1988: 54). Selgin asserts that a fractional reserve free banking system adjusts the supply of 
money to changes in its demand, keeping MV constant in the famous equation of exchange. 
When money holders increase their demand for money, they are really increasing their desire to 
hold bank liabilities (i.e., money substitutes). Accordingly, in an advanced free banking system 
the demand for money would be the demand for inside money or money substitutes as 
commodity money would not circulate. As a result, individuals write fewer checks on their cash 
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balances or retain the notes of a particular bank longer when the demand for money increases.  
By way of example, assume that a bank’s clearing debits equal its clearing credits before an 
increase in the demand for money occurs. An increase in the demand for money issued by a certain 
bank causes a reduction in adverse clearings against the bank. Consequently, bank reserves increase 
as the clearing balance turns positive. An increased demand by the public to hold its notes and 
deposits entices a profit-maximizing bank to expand credit, thus drawing down its excess reserves. 
The same process occurs when the general demand for money increases. Gross clearings are 
reduced when depositors write fewer checks or redeem fewer notes, thus reducing the bank’s need 
to hold precautionary reserves (Selgin 1988: 66). Banks may then profitably expand credit until 
their demand for reserves corresponds with their supply of reserves. In sum, increases in the 
demand for money lead to excess reserves as the volume of bank clearings falls. In such a scenario, 
according to Selgin, banks can expand credit to accommodate this increased demand for money.  
The reverse clearing process unfolds when the demand for money decreases. As depositors 
present checks and notes that previously circulated to their issuers, an increase in gross clearings 
occurs. Banks compensate by increasing their precautionary reserves by retiring loans and 
investments. A credit contraction, thus, equalizes the supply of money with its decreased demand.  
Selgin asserts that this process restores and maintains monetary equilibrium more efficiently 
than its alternatives: exogenous money supply changes by a central bank, or via changes in money’s 
purchasing power, as examples. Changes in money’s purchasing power also satisfy changes in the 
demand to hold money (i.e., the demand to hold real cash balances). Increases in the demand for 
real cash balances result when people abstain from spending, causing prices to fall. Conversely, as 
the demand for real cash balances decreases, people spend their cash balances accordingly and 
cause prices to rise. Selgin (1988: 53) acknowledges this alternative adjustment mechanism and 
states that long-run changes in money’s purchasing power can satisfy changes in the demand for 
money. He cautions, however, that “short-run corrections in the real money supply require changes 
in the nominal quantity of money” (1988: 54). In other words, changes in the purchasing power 
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required to satisfy changes in the demand to hold money work only in the long-run. Selgin gives 
two main reasons for this disparity.  
First, prices are rigid in the short-run, creating a potential excess demand or supply of 
money. More specifically, the downward rigidities of certain prices will increase the demand for 
money leading to a recession that is a “mirror image” of the traditional Austrian business cycle. 
This is caused by higher interest rates than the demand to hold money would normally dictate 
(Horwitz 1996: 291, 303).5 
Second, there may be a “monetary misconception” in the case of an increase in the demand 
for money that makes prices fall (Selgin 1988: 55). Each entrepreneur individually regards any 
decline in his revenues as a decline in the profitability of his particular business and reduces his 
output accordingly. A general downturn ensues as entrepreneurs in general fall prey to this 
misconception. Consequently, many free bankers believe that “a banking system that promotes 
deflation disrupts economic activity” (Selgin 1988: 56). Free bankers suffer from what Mark 
Thornton (2003) coins “apoplithorismosphobia”: a fear of deflation (or, at least, a special strain of 
it).6 They consequently welcome the inflation provided by the fractional reserve system that, due to 
its clearing mechanism, allegedly provides adequate levels of inflation at just the right moments.  
Selgin claims to have proven that a fractional reserve system is not only harmless but is also 
even necessary to maintain monetary equilibrium. The system responds to any increase in the 
demand for money with a corresponding increase in the money supply. Price declines are obstructed 
and recession summarily avoided. 
 
Limits to credit expansion in a free banking system 
Free bankers claim that a free banking system best maintains monetary equilibrium. One significant 
aspect of this equilibrium is that an increase in the demand for money constrains any credit 
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 The argument that prices are downward rigid and that an economy is improved with inflation if the demand for 
money increases is outside the scope of this article. We deal with this argument in Bagus and Howden (2010a). In 
the present paper we concentrate solely on inherent problems of the fractional reserve banking system and the 
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expansion. Consequently, any free banking system must be defended against the charge that it 
enables an unlimited credit expansion when the expansion is coordinated. Through cooperation and 
coordination, banks can mitigate their adverse clearing balances and remove the brake stopping 
individual banks from unduly expanding. With every bank expanding at the same rhythm no 
individual bank loses reserves. Selgin (1988: 54) asserts that in an advanced free banking system 
notes are continually utilized and not redeemed into commodity money. Consequently, the public’s 
redemption demands into commodity money cannot serve as a limit to credit expansion.  
In defense, Selgin comes up with a further limit on credit expansion. A bank’s demand for 
reserves consists of two components: “average net reserve demand” (which is the anticipated total 
difference of clearing debits and clearing credits in a period and which tends to zero in a 
coordinated expansion) and the “precautionary reserve demand” (Selgin 1988: 72). Banks hold 
precautionary reserves because the exact sum of the total of debits and credits is uncertain during a 
particular clearing session. The average net reserve demand will not increase during a coordinated 
expansion (as it nets to zero). However, the growth in total clearings will bring about a higher 
variance of clearing balances (both debits and credits). Banks respond by increasing their 
precautionary reserve requirements, thereby placing a limit on a coordinated credit expansion 
(Selgin 1988: 82).  
There are several reasons to doubt that the heightened precautionary reserve requirement 
would effectively limit a coordinated credit expansion.  
First, negative clearing balances would not necessarily imply a loss of reserves when banks 
cooperate. A bank with a positive clearing balance could just voluntarily refrain from redeeming 
notes from a bank with a negative clearing balance. These balances could instead be used as 
reserves for their own expansion. Moreover, an interbank market could develop where banks with a 
negative clearing balance could borrow from banks with a positive clearing balance. Interest paid 
and received for such loans would cancel out in the long-run. Such an institution of implicit or 
                                                                                                                                                            
relations between  the demand for money, savings and business cycles. 
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explicit arrangements concerning the short-term interbank financing of clearing deficits would 
make precautionary reserves essentially obsolete.  
A second method for banks to coordinate an unlimited credit expansion is to lengthen the 
clearing period. For clearing periods as short as an hour, or even a day, there may be important 
clearing balance divergences (whether positive or negative), even within a coordinated expansion. 
Prolonged clearing periods will lower any balance discrepancies when banks coordinate their 
expansion. No bank will lose reserves during a coordinated credit expansion in the long-run. 
Precautionary reserves are only necessary to mitigate reserve losses in the short-run. Positive and 
negative clearing balances will increasingly offset each other in direct relationship to the length of 
the clearing period. If the coordinating banks agree to clear debits and credits over a longer period, 
say every week, month or year, banks may reduce precautionary reserves accordingly.  
The cooperation of banks might become so close that they account for their debits and 
credits without physically clearing adverse balances.7 With a lengthened or unlimited clearing 
period, credit expansion is limited only by the redemption demands of the public that Selgin 
assumes to be nonexistent in a mature free banking system. 
There is a final reason why banks might actually reduce their precautionary reserves during 
a credit expansion. A rising money supply during a credit expansion increases both the negotiability 
of bank assets and, more importantly, their prices (Juan Ramón Rallo 2009a). Consequently, when 
banks engage in a coordinated credit expansion, higher clearing balance variances do not invoke a 
greater danger of illiquidity as bank assets rise in price and increase in liquidity. Banks can use 
these more valuable and saleable assets to compensate for any adverse clearing balances. 
 
Demand for fiduciary media is not exogenous to the banking system 
                                                                                                                                                            
6
 Bagus (2003) critically assesses differing Austrian perspectives on deflation. 
7
 Selgin (2001: 297-98) relies on the assumption that such cooperation would not occur in an attempt to demonstrate 
that there are limits to an in-concert overexpansion. At this point he even invokes a central bank to enforce a “stiff 
penalty-rate” in the interbank overnight loan market to halt an in-concert credit expansion. It is ironic that, as a free 
banker, Selgin must rely on the intervention of a central bank to show that the credit expansion of a free banking 
system would be restricted.  
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Selgin starts his analysis by assessing changes in the demand for money, not distinguishing between 
the demand for commodity money (money proper) and money substitutes (Rallo 2009b). Selgin´s 
base assumption is that all commodity money is deposited in the banking system and remains there 
or, at least, that the demand for money proper is constant. Nevertheless, there is an important 
difference between commodity money and money substitutes or bank liabilities.  
Bank liabilities (money substitutes) derive their value from money proper. Bank liabilities 
can lose their value or liquidity while money proper retains these qualities. Thus, the demands for 
money proper and bank liabilities need not necessarily trend in the same direction. During 
economic crises the demand for money proper generally increases while the demand for bank 
liabilities decreases, as the former is regarded as safer than the latter. In extreme situations there 
may even be a flight from bank liabilities if the financial system finds itself in significant illiquidity 
troubles: this is the common case of a bank run.  
The fractional reserve banking system actually causes booms that turn to busts because of its 
inherent ability to expand credit.8 During a post-boom recession, bank assets lose value leading to a 
loss of confidence by the holders of bank liabilities. At this point the demand for money substitutes 
tends to decrease, as holders sell them in exchange for safer money proper. The fractional reserve 
banking system is the cause of the instability in the demand for money proper. To assume a constant 
demand for money proper cannot be a starting point to analyze a system that endogenously changes 
it.  
Free bankers not only fail to distinguish between the demand for money proper and that of 
money substitutes, but also between the various reasons that money is demanded. By its 
macroeconomic approach the analysis of the demand for money conceals important microeconomic 
processes. 9 The increased demand for bank liabilities may result from a multitude of different 
causes.  
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 We assess the free banking system’s  inherent ability to expand credit in a following section: The detrimental effects of 
a fractional reserve free banking system. 
9
 We owe this point to José Ignacio del Castillo Martínez. 
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When a company gets commercial paper discounted by a bank, this company is effectively 
demanding bank liabilities. It exchanges its commercial paper against a demand deposit liability at 
the bank. When a company issues a 20-year bond, and deposits the receipts at a bank, the company 
is effectively demanding bank liabilities. When a deposit holder withdraws less money from his 
bank account during a certain period, he is increasing his demand for bank liabilities. When a 
company issues equity and deposits the receipts at a bank, the company is demanding bank 
liabilities. The motivations for these actions are very different and at times asymmetrical. The 
company that issues the 20-year bond wants to spend more money while the deposit holder that 
withdraws less money wants to spend less money.  
Fractional reserve free banking analysis advocates altering the money supply to counter 
changes in the demand to hold money, thus preventing a sluggish price adjustment process.10 Not all 
changes in the demand to hold money stem from supposed imbalances between money’s 
equilibrium and actual purchasing powers. By not properly distinguishing between the very reasons 
that individuals change their demand for money, fractional reserve free bankers are left with a 
glaring theoretical hole: when should banks alter the monetary base, and how are they signaled that 
this should be done. 
The free bankers´ analysis of the demand for money does not explain the reasons why the 
demand for money increases, instead treating it as an exogenous variable. The demand for money 
tends to change noticeably as perceived uncertainty changes, such as during times of wars, natural 
catastrophes or economic crises. By not discussing the reasons for changes in the demand for 
money, free bankers comfortably set aside any discussion as to the causes of crises. In fact, the 
credit expansion that a free banking system can carry out may cause artificially low interest rates 
and an unsustainable lengthening of the structure of production. 11 When this artificial expansion is 
reversed, a recession sets in and the demand to hold money tends to increase. Thus, the free banking 
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 Yeager (1997) provides a collection of essays outlining this process, which provides the foundation for subsequent 
free banking literature. 
11
 Ludwig von Mises (1943, 1998: 442fn17) emphasizes that all credit expansion distorts the structure of production 
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system itself may cause an increase in the demand for money. Paradoxically, this increase in 
demand is presented as a problem to which the free banking system itself is the solution. 
Free bankers repeat the error of the old Banking School when they treat the demand for 
money as exogenous to the banking system. Banking School theorists, such as John Fullarton 
(1844), argued that the “needs for trade” determine the demand for money. Expanding credit in 
response to a higher demand for money is reckoned to not only cause no harm but to also aid 
economic expansion. Banking School theorists and free bankers alike neglect the fact that the 
actions of the banking system can endogenously increase the demand for credit through reduced 
interest rates. The institutional setup of the banking system influences the demand for bank 
liabilities. Demand for future goods is not independent of their price. By lowering loan rates or 
softening credit conditions, a fractional reserve banking system can increase the demand for credit 
virtually without limit (Huerta de Soto 2006: 682-683). 
Moreover, the artificial boom caused by credit expansion may lead to an increased demand 
for bank liabilities. As the boom fuels optimism as nominal wealth increases, rising asset prices 
provide increased collateral against which an increased demand in bank liabilities can be issued 
(Bagus 2008). When the banking system satisfies the demand for fiduciary media through credit 
expansion the boom feeds upon itself. 
 
Confusion between savings and the demand for cash holdings 
Selgin states that the willingness to hold money is the willingness to save, and that holding bank 
liabilities ultimately means acting as a lender of credit (1988: 55). Similarly, Horwitz (1992: 135) 
states that:  
 
Savers supply real loanable funds based on their endowments and intertemporal preferences. 
Banks serve as intermediaries to redirect savings to investors via money creation. Depositors 
                                                                                                                                                            
and that free banking allows for it. 
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give banks custody of their funds, and banks create loans based on these deposits. The 
creation (supply) of money corresponds to a supply of funds for investment use by firms.  
 
Horwitz suggests that the creation of deposits increases the supply of savings as depositors are 
lenders of real loanable funds. In other words, the mere creation of credit and the corresponding 
new deposits constitute an increase in real savings. Yet the creation of fiduciary media is not 
equivalent to an increase in real savings necessary to sustain a more roundabout production process. 
Real saving implies an abstention from consumption while the production of fiduciary media does 
not; fiduciary media may be, and are, created ex nihilo. Holding newly created money is not an 
increase in real saving. To think otherwise confuses the nominal money supply with real resources. 
If the U.S. government would decree to add a zero to every bank note and demand deposit, people 
would very likely be willing to hold a larger nominal balance of bank liabilities after the decree. 
However, this would not constitute an increase in real savings. 
Creating money to offset an increase in the demand for money or a decrease in its velocity 
does not create new real resources. Increased monetary savings does not mean that there is 
additional real savings. Real savings are required to sustain the factors of production during the 
production process. Increases in the money supply serve to create only an illusion of wealth.12 
Horwitz (1996: 291-92) argues that holding fiduciary media is equivalent to saving, relying 
on their supposed equivalence to outline a “mirror image” Austrian business cycle. He argues that 
an increase in the demand for money implies an increase in real savings. If banks do not expand 
credit and let interest rates fall to reflect the increase in savings, interest rates will be too high: an 
artificial shortening of the structure of production results. 
People hold money because it is the most liquid good and mitigates future uncertainty. 
Money’s utility in this role largely determines its demand. In this respect, the complete availability 
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 Monetary equilibrium theorists must indirectly accept a version of the Keynesian multiplier principle. When the 
“velocity of money” falls, an increase in the money supply will not imply more real savings, as it will not create any 
more goods or services except to the extent that it is believed that the multiplier stimulates spending. We thank Toby 
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of money is crucial for it to mitigate future uncertainty. A “suspension clause” on bank notes as 
advocated by free bankers (White 1984; Selgin 1988: 137; Selgin and White 1994: 1726, 1997) 
changes the availability of money and forces depositors to save for the duration of the suspension, 
i.e., depositors are forced to grant an obligatory loan to the bank.  
Conversely, when people have a sufficient uncertainty hedge via their deposits, they may 
attempt to increase their monetary wealth by investing. They do this directly as an investment, or 
indirectly by loaning the money to someone else who desires to invest directly. The level of 
investment that an economy can successfully complete depends on its available savings. Investment 
projects are only carried out to completion if a sufficient quantity of real production factors has 
been made available by abstaining from consumption.  
The time horizon in which people are willing to sacrifice and reduce consumption is 
important for investment sustainability. Hence, there are important differences between distinct 
savings instruments (or investments): as examples, cash holdings, an equity investment, a 3-month 
loan, or a 30-year bond. All of these represent important forms of savings/investments, but they 
involve different durations, liquidity and risk.  
The disparate maturities of savings differentiate sums of monetary savings from each other. 
Horwitz (1996: 299) abstracts from the duration of savings, stating that “demanding bank liabilities 
is an act of savings.” For him a bank deposit of $1,000 or an investment of $1,000 in a 30-year bond 
releases identical savings to be invested in long-term projects. Can a long-term investment – a 30-
year mortgage, for example – be issued against either of these savings with equal effects on the 
structure of production? The unequivocal answer is: no (Bagus and Howden 2010b).  
Changes in time preference rates are independent of the demand to hold money as a cash 
balance (Hülsmann 2009). The corollary that arises is that the demand for money can change 
without a corresponding change in either the time preference rates or the consumption-savings 
relationship. 
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People can abstain, for example, from reinvesting their resources by amortizing their 
investments. A relative shift away from investment projects (i.e., future goods) has occurred which 
increases both cash balances and time preference. Free bankers argue that any increase in the 
demand to hold bank liabilities constitutes an increase in savings. Following the logic of their 
argument, they must maintain that the divestment of capital (i.e., the tearing down of machinery and 
factories, etc.), in order to increase cash balances is a sign of an increased demand for money and 
represents an increase in savings. Accordingly, banks could and should expand credit when their 
reserves increase so that investors can commence investment projects (i.e., buying machines and 
building factories). 13 
This credit expansion will not correspond to individuals’ desires. Real cash balances have 
increased either in response to the perception of increased uncertainty, or in preparation of future 
consumption opportunities. At the same time, they have divested, increasing the proportion of their 
consumption relative to real investment spending, i.e., their time preference has increased. Carrying 
out a credit expansion to entice new investments would then lead to malinvestments, as the real 
quantity of savings available to sustain investment projects has not increased.  
It is also possible that the demand for cash holdings increases while time preference 
decreases: people can abstain from consumption in order to add to their cash balances. This 
constitutes an increase in savings and allows the structure of production to lengthen (Huerta de Soto 
1996: 448-49). Factors of production are liberated and made available for investment projects. The 
effect is the same as if the investment was made directly into these projects. As Mises (1998: 519) 
summarizes it: 
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 Rothbard (2004: 788) and Hoppe (1992) criticize the Keynesian error that the demand for money determines the 
interest rate, maintaining that income can be spent on three margins: investing, consumption and hoarding. 
Hülsmann (1996: 34) argues that one can also save and invest in cash balances by holding money units. The two 
views are in fact reconcilable when we recognize that we could still have three margins acknowledging Hülsmann´s 
point: investing in cash balances, investing in real investment projects and consumption spending. In fact, there is a 
continuum as investment projects are of different durations. Thus, individuals may invest their money for 3 months, 
1 year or 30 years before they want to increase their consumption. Changes in the spending on these indefinite 
margins influence the length of possible investment projects. For instance, when resources that were previously 
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 Whenever  an  individual  devotes a sum of money to saving instead of  spending it for 
consumption, the process  of  saving  agrees perfectly  with  the  process  of  capital 
accumulation and investment. It does not matter whether the individual saver does or does 
not increase his cash holding. The act  of  saving always has  its  counterpart  in  a  supply of  
goods  produced  and  not consumed,  of  goods  available  for  further  production  
activities. A man's savings are always embodied in concrete capital goods. 
 
A further alternative is that changes in the demand for cash holdings do not affect time preference 
rates at all: investment and consumption spending can be reduced by equal proportions with no 
systematic change to time preference. 
The demand to hold real cash balances can decrease while time preference increases, 
decreases or remains the same depending on how the reduction of cash balances affects the ratio 
between investment and consumption expenditures. There is no necessary relation between time 
preference rates and the demand for money. Furthermore, changes in neither the demand nor supply 
of money are necessarily related to changes in interest rates. Changes in the supply or demand for 
money can affect interest rates in the short-run if they act through credit markets (for instance, 
during a credit expansion). Thus, the artificial reduction of interest rates during a credit expansion is 
the result of an inflated money supply through the credit markets. Banks can only place additional 
loans via interest rate reductions.  
Increases in the supply of money proper (i.e., gold production under a gold standard) does 
not necessarily have the same effect. Owners of gold mines may just bid up the prices of the goods 
and services they buy, keeping interest rates steady. Cantillon effects and wealth redistribution will 
result, but no systematic change in interest rates need occur.14  
The confusion between increases in savings and cash holdings is a confusion between stock 
                                                                                                                                                            
invested for one year are reinvested for 30 years, longer-term investment projects now become more sustainable. 
14
 Although not necessary, interest rates may change along the structure of savings due to redistributions between actors 
with distinct time preference rates (Bagus and Howden 2010b) 
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and flow variables. Saving is a flow variable; the part of income that is not consumed. Cash 
holdings (savings) represent a stock in existence. Cash holdings do not represent saving. One may 
actually increase cash holdings by saving less (and consuming more), for example spending a 
smaller portion of the available income on investments (or selling investments in order to consume). 
Fractional reserve banking leads to a change in the stock variable (cash holdings) that may create 
the artificial perception of a change in the flow variable (saving). This misperception is not without 
potential negative consequences as entrepreneurs may be misled into committing malinvestments.15 
There is yet another mystery inherent in the idea that holding bank liabilities amounts to 
saving. Why would holding money proper not be savings? Moreover, if holding money proper were 
an act of saving, why would it lead to prohibitively high interest rates?  
Let us assume that individual A holds a quantity of money proper, such as gold coins (or fiat 
paper money), under his mattress for safekeeping. Now he decides to transfer the coins to a bank – 
there has been a crime in his neighborhood recently and he regards the bank as a more secure 
warehouse than his mattress. Following the free bankers’ reasoning, bank reserves and the 
willingness to hold bank liabilities now increase, and banks can and should expand credit in 
response. Yet there is no increase in A’s savings in this example; the coins (cash holdings) have just 
changed location.  
The expansion of credit leads to artificially low interest rates. “Hoarding” unaccompanied 
by credit expansion does not lead to artificially high interest rates. Increases in hoarded money that 
stem from a reduction in consumption expenditures cause the interest rate to decline; prices of 
consumption goods will fall. The price spread in the time structure of production between buying 
and selling proceeds is reduced accordingly (Rothbard 2004: 367-452). The demand for present 
goods falls relative to the demand for future goods, causing interest rates to fall. 
The argument that an increase in the demand for money amounts to an increase in savings 
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 Howden (2010) argues that entrepreneurs are further disadvantaged as the fractional reserve banking system 
magnifies this misperception depending on the distance from the initial change in the money supply the 
entrepreneurs find themselves. As knowledge concerning the credit creation process increasingly deteriorates with 
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(or the rate of saving) is essential for the alleged need of a fractional reserve banking system. Yet 
there is no systematic relationship between savings and the demand for money. Fractional reserve 
banks face an identification problem because increases in reserves can be caused by abstentions of 
both consumption and investment. There is no way for banks to know if an increase in reserves 
means that people are abstaining from consumption or divesting from investment projects. Free 
bankers must still answer this mystery: how can banks consistently discern the causes of changes in 
reserve levels (either increases or decreases). Lacking an answer to this question, free bankers must 
maintain that banks should react the same way to changes in saving and divesting. Fractional 
reserve free bankers would have to maintain that banks should induce credit expansion (with a 
commensurate increase in investment) when there are both more savings available and, 
paradoxically, when entrepreneurs are divesting (i.e., relatively decreasing their saving). Free 
bankers must identify where the coordinating activity of inducing further investment when faced 
with divesting entrepreneurs will come from. How would it be coordinating to induce investments 
when people want to divest? 
 
The monetary equilibrium approach and individual demand for cash balances 
There are some additional problems with the macroeconomic monetary equilibrium approach 
defended by some proponents of the free banking school. It must first be remembered that the 
demand for money is the demand to hold real cash balances, i.e., it is a demand for real monetary 
services (Hülsmann 2003: 50; Mises 1998: 421 [I think this is better than page 399.]). An increase 
in perceived uncertainty causes individuals to increase their real cash balances in preparation.  
First, the uniqueness of the perception of this uncertainty causes the demand for cash 
balances to be strictly individual. When it is claimed that the demand for money increases, it must 
be remembered that it is always individuals that increase their demand, and that members of the 
general population might not increase these balances in the same proportion. Free bankers argue 
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that a free banking system meets an increased demand for money by increasing the supply of 
fiduciary media. Yet, they overlook the microeconomic mystery concerning how the fiduciary 
media will get to the same individuals who have increased their demand for money. Furthermore, 
they do not explain why issuing fiduciary media would achieve the desired result more quickly than 
adjusting real cash holdings directly.  
While free banking monetary equilibrium theorists face this knowledge problem, a 100-
percent reserve system does not. In fact, in a 100-percent reserve system, when individual A wants 
to increase his real cash holding he just abstains from either investment or consumption 
expenditures or sells assets. “Monetary equilibrium” is restored immediately. Consequently, some 
prices may fall or some services may remain unsold until prices adjust downward fully.16  
The monetarist equilibrium approach, however, recommends that the price level remains 
constant by producing new fiduciary media via the fractional reserve banking system to give to A. 
The mystery that remains is how a bank will know that A has increased his demand for cash 
holdings (which he has, in fact, already satisfied by abstaining from spending). Bank B, due to 
positive clearing and higher reserves may now grant a loan to entrepreneur C. Yet, this was not 
necessary as A has already satisfied his increased demand for money. Prices will tend to be bid up if 
C spends the money. This will actually reduce the real cash holdings of A, who sees his intentions 
frustrated. Consequently, A will further abstain from spending, leading to an additional decline in 
prices. This will be frustrated by further issuances of fiduciary media.  
At some point the additional money may flow to A (although this need not necessarily 
happen). When C spends his money via purchases with other actors, the cash balances of the other 
actors could increase above the level that they desire.17 Consequently they will make expenditures 
to reduce their own cash balances, the proceeds of which could end up in A’s hands. This is, 
however, a convoluted and indirect process that is more burdensome than directly increasing his 
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 The same happens when all individuals increase their demand for real cash balances. They abstain from spending 
until prices have come to the level that satisfies their desired real cash balance.  
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cash balance (Huerta de Soto 2009: 689). There is no reason why the indirect path of increasing A’s 
cash balance through the issuance of fiduciary media is favorable to directly increasing it through 
increased holding of money proper. 
It is thus unnecessary to increase the supply of money in the face of increased demand; it 
frustrates the adjustment process. Money in this regard is different than other goods because its 
services depend directly on its purchasing power. An increase in the production of bread satisfies an 
increase in the demand for bread. An increase in the demand for money services (real cash 
balances) cannot be satisfied by an increase in the production of money because an increase in the 
money supply decreases, ceteris paribus, the purchasing power and consequent services of each and 
every monetary unit.  
Second, increases in the quantity of money proper raise problems that must be addressed. 
Following the logic of monetary disequilibrium theorists, activities that increase the quantity of 
money proper (i.e., gold mining in a gold standard), without a corresponding increase in the demand 
for money would lead to an excess supply of money, artificially low interest rates and business 
cycles. Increases in money (i..e., gold), or money producing activities (i.e., minting) would be 
regarded as harmful.18 This line of argumentation does not allow for the fact that increases in the 
money supply do not necessarily affect interest rates in a systematic way. Only when new money is 
introduced through credit markets are interest rates affected systematically. 
Third, Selgin (1988:55) invokes a monetary misconception argument, also used by real 
business cycle theorists. The argument states that entrepreneurs see the prices of their products fall 
and think that the profitability of their own products is affected negatively.  
Entrepreneurs do have the ability to forecast and anticipate. Entrepreneurs anticipate the 
future demand for money and the future prices of their products when bidding for the factors of 
production. They may err when estimating the demand for money, as well as the relative demand 
                                                                                                                                                            
17
 Note that this outcome will not result if prices are bid-up faster than the increase in nominal cash balances. 
18
 Of course, much free banking literature relies on a frozen fiat monetary base to limit credit expansion (i.e., Selgin 
1988: chap. 11; 1994: 1449). Consequently, issues arising from an excess supply of money due to, for example, 
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for their products. Yet there is no reason why they should err systematically in one direction. In fact, 
any monetary misconception provides a profit opportunity for entrepreneurs to exploit.  
Free bankers fail to explain why entrepreneurs would systematically err in one direction and 
not exploit these profit opportunities. 
 
The detrimental effects of a fractional reserve free banking system  
A fractional reserve free banking system enables credit expansion. This occurs via three basic 
mechanisms. First, increases in base money by the production of commodity money may increase 
reserves and allow for credit expansion. Second, increases in the demand for fiduciary media enable 
a credit expansion as free bankers have pointed out. Third, the cooperation of the banks within the 
banking system enables credit expansion. 
Any credit expansion distorts the structure of production. Credit expansion causes 
artificially low interest rates which induce entrepreneurs to embark upon more investment projects 
than can be successfully completed.19 Thus, a fractional reserve free banking system enables a 
primary cause of business cycles: artificially low interest rates. 
More investment projects are started than can be completed successfully with the available 
resources. Some of these projects are liquidated when it becomes obvious that there are not enough 
real resources available to complete all projects. The liquidated projects are malinvestments that 
were only undertaken because entrepreneurs were deceived by the credit expansion. Credit 
expansion and the tendency for lower interest rates makes entrepreneurs think that there are more 
resources available than in reality. A discoordination is created between savers and investors. 
Fractional reserve free banking usually restricts credit expansion more than a central 
banking system, a point emphasized by free bankers. As there may be adverse clearing and 
customers demanding money proper, there are limits to the boom that are narrower than in a central 
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 Conversely, entrepreneurs might anticipate the effect of the additional money supply on prices and bid up interest 
rates accordingly (Hülsmann 1998). In this case, there are no artificially low interest rates and consequently there is 
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banking system without cooperation between banks. Nevertheless, the promotion of business cycles 
cannot be ruled out as fractional reserve free banking still allows for credit expansion.20 This 
explicitly arises because free bankers call for credit expansion in response to increases in the 
demand for money.  
Mises (1928) and Hayek (1928) have pointed out that price stabilization in times of 
economic growth leads to business cycles as credit expands to compensate for the downward 
pressure on prices. Economic growth coupled with a stable money supply will cause prices to fall. 
If banks expand credit to stabilize prices, interest rates will be lower than they otherwise would 
have been and below the level indicated by the amount of real savings. An artificial boom may arise 
if more projects are started than can be sustained by the amount of real savings.  
Similarly, a stabilization of the price level as imagined by free bankers may also lead to an 
artificial boom. With an increased demand for money, prices fall to adjust to this higher demand. 
Assuming that time preferences and the level of output do not change, there are no more savings or 
real resources available to begin investment projects. As there are no more savings available interest 
rates will not change due to the increased demand for money. A fractional reserve bank that 
increases credit in this situation will lower the interest rate below what it would have been if 
determined solely by market forces and real savings. More investment projects are begun than can 
be successfully completed. They cannot be completed without an increase in savings. However, no 
more real resources are available as time preferences did not change. Interest rates fell due to credit 
expansion and not due to a reduction in time preference rates signaling an increased willingness to 
abstain from consumption. Consumers are not willing to abstain from consumption until the 
projects financed by credit expansion reach completion. Consumers desire higher cash balances 
which price level changes would have satisfied without changing the relationship between 
                                                                                                                                                            
no artificial boom. 
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 “The notion of ‘normal’ credit expansion is absurd. Issuance of additional fiduciary media, no matter what its quantity 
may be, always sets in motion those changes in the price structure the description of which is the task of the theory 
of the trade cycle… Free banking … [would not] hinder a slow credit expansion” (Mises 1998: 442fn17 and 443). 
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consumption and investment spending.21 Consequently, any policy that increases credit in response 
to an increase in money demand will be destabilizing. Boom-bust cycles will be promoted the same 
way as when price stabilization during times of economic growth is pursued. 
A final detrimental effect of a fractional reserve free banking system is that it creates a 
tendency towards the creation of a central banking system (Huerta de Soto 2006: 713). As we have 
pointed out, a coordinated credit expansion further increases the limits of credit expansion as there 
is no (or only limited) adverse clearing. Coordination leads to higher banking system profits. It is 
not easy to organize, much less coordinate, such an equal credit expansion. A cartel may break up at 
any moment as banks that expand credit less than the average of the cartel will have an incentive to 
leave. This exodus threatens the liquidity of the cartel’s more expansive members. Banks that are 
more expansive will lose reserves to the less expansive banks because of the clearing process, 
eventually becoming illiquid and insolvent. Therefore, a cartel is risky when it cannot be legally 
enforced, allowing banks to leave the cartel to drive the rest into bankruptcy.  
Until the breakdown of the cartel, the coordinated credit expansion involves very attractive 
profits. Consequently, there arises an incentive to install an entity that coordinates and orchestrates 
the credit expansion, such as a central bank. The central bank effectively cartelizes the banking 
system and sets the rhythm of credit expansion. It guides the banking system by interest rate 
signals, open market operations, minimum reserve requirements, verbal communications and 
regulatory supervision. An attractive profit-reaping rate of credit expansion is secured with no 
danger of banks leaving the cartel or excessively expanding in relation to others. 
Bankers have an additional incentive to demand the installation of a central bank as a lender 
of last resort. The credit expansion of the fractional reserve banks leads to an artificial boom that 
inevitably causes a recession. During recessions the assets of banks lose value because of bad loans 
and asset market losses. Depositors consequently lose confidence in specific banks or the whole 
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 Consumers might increase their cash balances by divesting and increasing their time preference. In this case, 
consumers increase consumption relative to investment spending. They strive to consume more now at the expense 
of future consumption. Inducing more long-term investment projects by credit expansion as free bankers suggest 
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banking system, demanding redemption in money proper. As banks lose reserves, liquidity 
problems feed solvency problems and bank runs or panics might ensue. During the recessions that 
the fractional reserve banking system ultimately causes, banks find themselves in liquidity trouble. 
If one bank goes bankrupt, depositors may lose confidence in others. The interconnectivity of the 
banking system may bring the whole system down. Distrust and bank runs spread and losses soar. 
Bankers who are aware of this problem demand a lender of last resort: the central bank.  
Bankers cause booms and busts via credit expansions and later demand the establishment of 
a central bank due to the problems they experience during these self-made recessions. Advocates of 
free banking have yet to demonstrate how a system prone to causing economic cycles would not fall 
prey to creating the very institution they wish to avoid: the central bank. 
 
Conclusion 
While Selgin´s use of monetary equilibrium theory to advocate a free banking system was certainly 
innovative, there remain many quibbles. Specifically, it remains unclear why monetary equilibrium 
requires free banking, and how it will avoid certain detrimental outcomes. 
A concerted expansion of the money supply cannot be obstructed as easily as the free 
bankers believe. Changes to both the duration of the clearing period and redemption restraints from 
banks with positive net clearing balances allow for extended periods of monetary expansion. A 
basic free banking assumption – that the demand for money is exogenous to the banking system – 
rests on a conflation between money and money substitutes. The demand for money can shift 
independently of the demand for money substitutes. Demand for money is price-influenced, thus 
allowing it to be endogenously determined within the banking system. Regardless of money’s 
purchasing power the demand for loans tends to increase when banks lower interest rates. 
 We have explored the complex and oft-misunderstood relationship between time preference, 
savings and the demand for money, understood as the demand for real cash holdings. There exists 
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no fixed relationship between these variables. Increases in bank reserves need not solely stem from 
abstaining from consuming, but may also result from a reduction in investment. How the banking 
system will determine whether an increase in the demand for money stems from disinvestment of 
capital or abstention from consumption remains to be seen. 
 Perhaps the most troubling aspect of a free banking system is that it leads to systematic 
boom-bust cycles – Austrian business cycles – that many free bankers are trying to avoid. By 
expanding credit without increased real saving, interest rates are reduced artificially. More 
investment projects are undertaken than resources are available to complete. The artificial reduction 
of interest rates causes malinvestments that must later be liquidated in a recession. As bankers 
become aware that their business is prone to systemic insolvencies (or at least substantial liquidity 
restraints during recessions), they have an incentive to demand a lender of last resort to aid them 
through these very problems that are ultimately caused by their own credit expansion. Distortions 
caused by a fractional reserve free banking system eventually necessitate the creation of a lender of 
last resort: a central bank. Moreover, bankers have another incentive to call for a central bank. A 
central bank enables more highly coordinated credit expansion, thereby preventing reserve losses 
and providing more stable and attractive profits.  
 The free bankers have done much to demonstrate the evils of a centralized banking system. 
Perhaps they should turn their attention to the detrimental aspects of their own alternative. 
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